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The global financial crisis in 2008 was a significant watershed for governments 
everywhere. Diminished prospects for growth coupled with continuing demands 
for government interventions and chronic constraints on resources, prompted 
in part by the widespread adoption of variants of neo-liberalism (constrain 
 resources to limit spending and shrink governments), have created fiscal envi-
ronments where rationing expenditures among programs and policies is chronic 
and even acute.
One response to these situations is to systematically assess government 
 expenditures, in effect, looking for savings by conducting broad-based spend-
ing reviews. The OECD has advocated for conducting spending reviews (OECD, 
2011). Spending reviews can be used to address several objectives, including to 
tackle deficits and debt, to reallocate funds for better policy prioritization and effi-
cacy, and to create fiscal space for new initiatives (Hawkesworth & Klepsvik, 2013; 
IMF, 2015; Moynihan & Beazley, 2016; OECD, 2011, 2016). In times of significant 
fiscal restraint, other possible objectives of spending reviews can be symbolic or 
justificatory. For example, they can be used as a communications tool, to support 
or bolster government legitimacy, to bring about line ministry fiscal discipline, or 
to publicly justify difficult budget decisions.
Our special issue of the Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation explores 
ways that evaluation can be linked to systematic, evidence-based assessments of 
government expenditures. We include articles that offer international, national 
(Canadian), and provincial (Quebec) perspectives. In this introduction, we sum-
marize key themes in the articles offered by our contributors and, where appropri-
ate, knit them together.
In the synthesis that follows the six articles in this volume, we reflect on key 
themes and offer an overall assessment of the prospects for linking evaluation and 
spending reviews.
Marc Robinson’s article, “The Role of Evaluation in Spending Review”  offers 
us an international overview that explores the current and prospective links 
between evaluations and spending review. He defines key terms, including what 
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spending review is: “. . . a process for systematically scrutinizing baseline expendi-
ture to identify and implement savings measures.” Baseline expenditures are exist-
ing expenditures, so spending review is aimed at assessing what is currently being 
spent with a view to finding ways of reducing/reallocating. Reducing expenditures 
can occur via strategic cuts (doing less) or efficiency cuts (improving productivity 
and operating efficiency). Typically, governments make budget decisions that are 
intended to do both.
Robinson suggests six possible criteria for constructing the terms of reference 
for spending review: relevance, duplication, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and 
market failure (the question of whether the private sector or other entities could 
provide particular programs). Among those, effectiveness is a key criterion, since 
it speaks to a core question in most program evaluations: Did the program or 
policy achieve (or contribute to) its intended results?
A significant point he makes is that the international financial crisis of 2008 
has altered the fiscal picture for governments, globally. Demands for expenditures 
continue and arguably will grow as the impacts of climate change are factored into 
government programs and expenditures. But public resources are scarce, and this 
trend has accelerated since 2008. This pressure, with some exceptions, does not 
appear to be alleviated by deficit spending—that is a norm that is traceable to new 
public management and, more broadly, neo-liberalism internationally.
Robinson sees evaluation as a prospective contributor to the rational in-
formation bases that comprise the foundation for spending review. At the same 
time, he acknowledges that the record of actual uses of evaluation-related lines 
of information in spending review processes internationally is very limited. In 
our volume, this gap between expectations for evaluation and what has actually 
been accomplished is an important theme. Broadly, the gap between promise and 
performance is one that extends to all evaluation-related endeavours, including 
performance measurement (McDavid & Huse, 2012).
Robinson suggests six possible factors (some of which are closely related) 
that explain this gap between what evaluation could do for spending review and 
what has actually happened. Among those reasons are themes that are picked up 
in other articles in our volume: evaluations are focused on program improvement, 
are intended to help managers, and tend to make positive program improvement 
recommendations (Mayne’s article, among others, picks these themes up); evalu-
ation functions in countries tend to be decentralized to spending departments 
(Shepherd, Mayne, Dobell and Zussman, and Bourgeois and Whynot all mention 
this issue); judgments about program effectiveness are rarely “yes” and “no” and 
are based on fallible lines of evidence (Dobell and Zussman, among other con-
tributors, make this point); and the tendency for evaluation terms of reference to 
not give a lot of weight to questions focused on budget savings (Mayne, Shepherd, 
and Dobell and Zussman all comment on the effects of the decentralized insti-
tutional home for the Canadian federal evaluation function [evaluation units 
report to their respective deputy ministers] on its potential for delivering strategic 
evaluation-related information).
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John Mayne’s article, “Linking Evaluation to Expenditure Reviews: Neither 
Realistic nor a Good Idea,” argues (picking up on a theme in Robinson’s article) 
that not only have evaluations not contributed to spending reviews (Mayne calls 
them expenditure reviews), but, in the current federal government of Canada 
evaluation function, they should not. In Mayne’s view, the existing program evalu-
ation function in the federal government is generally well-positioned to contrib-
ute through periodic formative evaluations of programs to the ongoing program 
management–related dialogue in departments and agencies among program 
managers, evaluators, and even departmental executives (to whom evaluators re-
port). The federal program evaluation function has persisted for over 40 years and 
although it has taken some significant knocks, as Mayne and other contributors 
to this volume acknowledge, it continues to be an important part of the analytical 
capacity of departments and agencies.
Mayne reprises some of the history of federal program evaluation, pointing 
out that in 1981 there was a clearly stated expectation that evaluations would “. . . 
produce credible, timely, useful, and objective findings on programs appropriate 
for resource allocation, program improvement and accountability” (Mayne, quot-
ing the Treasury Board Secretariat’s [1981, p. 3] Guide on the Evaluation Function). 
Evaluation would be both formative and summative and would be able to cover a 
wide range of expectations for the function.
As Mayne and others in this volume note, this range of expectations has not 
been fulfilled. Dobell and Zussman point out that evaluation’s contributions to 
spending reviews in Canada starting with the 1984–1986 Nielsen task force have 
been desultory. But, unlike some other commentators, Mayne is clear that having 
the existing decentralized evaluation function is an asset—not for all the purposes 
adduced in 1981, but for formative assessments of programs with a view to im-
proving their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
If evaluation is going to make a contribution to expenditure reviews, Mayne, 
like Robinson and Shepherd in this volume, suggests that a different evaluation 
function needs to be created that would be housed in a central agency (he sug-
gests Treasury Board). This is not a new idea (Dobell and Zussman reference 
publications and reports that speak to creating an evaluator general for the federal 
government) to mirror the mandate of the auditor general and address the cur-
rent asymmetry between evaluation and audit functions, wherein audit is both a 
decentralized (internal audit units) and a centralized function, whereas evaluation 
is not.
The article by Isabelle Bourgeois and Jane Whynot, “Strategic Evaluation 
Utilization in the Canadian Federal Government,” is the first in our volume that 
examines evaluation use empirically in Canadian federal departments and con-
nects uses with strategic decision-making. They have done a comparative case-
study analysis that focuses on all program evaluation reports completed between 
2010 and 2013 in two federal departments. Their two lines of evidence are a 
content analysis of the program evaluation reports and qualitative interviews with 
program managers and evaluators in both departments.
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They acknowledge the importance of the literature on evaluation use—
using evaluations is an enduring theme in both the scholarship and practice in 
the evaluation field—and point out that—aside from the now standard typology 
of four uses: instrumental (contributing to program-related decisions); concep-
tual (contributing the background knowledge of stakeholders with respect to a 
program or set of programs); symbolic (rationalizing program or policy-related 
decisions by pointing, post hoc, to particular evaluation findings or even the fact 
that an evaluation has been done); and process (the fact that an evaluation is being 
done influences program or even organizational behaviours)—there are strategic 
uses. They define strategic uses this way, “we refer to the application of evaluation 
results to broader, organizational-level decisions, which often include budgetary 
considerations.” Such uses could intersect with any of the other four types of 
uses—what distinguishes them is the focus on organizational-level influences of 
evaluation products and processes.
What they find from assessing the evaluation reports and from their in-
terviews is that there are no evident strategic uses of the program evaluations 
produced between 2010 and 2013 in those two departments. The significance of 
this finding is that, during that time, there was a program review in 2010 (one of 
a series mandated annually by Treasury Board starting in 2007) and the Deficit 
Reduction Action Plan in 2012 (mandated by the Conservative government to 
identify four billion dollars in savings by 2015). Their findings suggest that those 
review processes did not make use of the stock of available program evaluations.
Unlike Robinson and Mayne in this volume, Bourgeois and Whynot suggest 
that it might be possible to work within the existing institutional structure for the 
evaluation function to get more purchase for strategic-level uses of program eval-
uations. They recommend focusing on portfolios of programs as the main unit of 
analysis to create more opportunities to compare performance (this has been done 
selectively since the 2009 Evaluation Policy was implemented); refocusing the core 
evaluation questions away from the mandatory “relevance and performance” set 
(these reappear in the directive that accompanies the 2016 Treasury Board Policy 
on Results) to better reflect the concerns of senior departmental decision-makers; 
and making the timing of evaluations more flexible to better reflect the informa-
tion needs of decision-makers (this is possible given the risk-based approach to 
evaluation planning that is part of the 2016 Policy on Results).
Robert Shepherd’s article, “ Expenditure Reviews and the Federal Experi-
ence: Program Evaluation and Its Contribution to Assurance Provision,” offers us 
a comprehensive public administrative overview of what he calls the assurance-
related policies, instruments to implement those policies, and the roles that evalu-
ation plays in each of five different forms of federal government –based assurance: 
policy and program coherence, internal program performance, government per-
formance, systems improvement, and public accountability. At the same time that 
he is pointing to the different roles that evaluation has played or is expected to play 
across a wide range of purposes for assurance and a wide array of stakeholders, he 
is suggesting that federal evaluation has not lived up to its expectations.
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In different words, evaluation, with its rich history of seeking relevance in 
a changing governmental and policy environment, has been saddled with ex-
pectations that are arguably incompatible. In his own assessment of the federal 
evaluation function (Shepherd, 2012), he pointed out that, given the (then) 2009 
Evaluation Policy and its premium on accountability-related uses of program 
evaluations, the function was not delivering for key stakeholders. His observa-
tion then was that time was running out to align the evaluation function with 
government assurance-related expectations. Mayne, of course, would argue that 
the capacity of the function to resist these changing expectations while continuing 
to deliver formative evaluations that make a difference to program managers and 
other internal stakeholders is a sign of its enduring relevance.
Although Shepherd suggests (Table 1 in his article) that expenditure reviews 
intersect with “internal program performance” as a form of assurance, the focus 
of expenditure reviews on cross-program and cross-government assessments and 
comparisons does not sit comfortably with the existing program evaluation policy 
(in the 2016 Policy on Results, as Shepherd points out, there is no substantive 
mention of program effectiveness in the policy). Instead program evaluation is 
relegated to the accompanying directive, where the language is similar (relevance 
and performance) to that included in the 2009 Evaluation Policy.
What is to be done? Shepherd suggests two options. One is similar to what 
Mayne and Robinson have suggested—create and resource a central agency evalu-
ation unit, the purpose of which would be to conduct expenditure review–related 
evaluations. That unit would, in effect, be expected to design and execute sum-
mative evaluations that are intended to meet the decision-making needs of stake-
holders involved in budget-related reviews.
The second option is to create separate evaluation units within federal de-
partments and give those units a mandate to conduct expenditure evaluations. 
Recalling the Bourgeois and Whynot article, these units would be focused on 
meeting the needs for strategic decision-making fora. If we look at this option for 
a moment, Shepherd suggests that building trust around the mission and opera-
tions of these units would be critical—in part because they would continue to 
rely on program managers and perhaps even their formative evaluation–focused 
colleagues for information. In effect, he appears to be signalling a need to reorient 
the evaluation-related cultures of departments and agencies.
Rod Dobell and David Zussman, “Sunshine, Scrutiny, and Spending Review 
in Canada, Trudeau to Trudeau: From Program Evaluation and Policy to Com-
mitment and Results,” offer us an article that brackets the 50-plus years of Cana-
dian federal evaluation policy and practice but goes well beyond that to include 
contemporary issues, such as freedom of information policy and its impacts on all 
the analytical (evidence-based) work that supports federal government decision-
making. As well they include observations related to deliverology, as a current 
evaluation-related initiative of the Liberal government, and assess the prospects 
for program evaluation (and the evaluation function) generally, and, specifically, 
to make contributions to future expenditure reviews.
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In 1981, Dobell and Zussman published an article in Canadian Public Ad-
ministration, “An Evaluation System for Government: If Politics Is Theatre Then 
Evaluation Is (Mostly) Art” (Dobell & Zussman, 1981). That article pointed out 
that the (then) new program evaluation function, even at that time, was not meet-
ing expectations. Mayne points out that in hindsight the expectations were not 
achievable given the institutional base of the program evaluation function.
A theme in their 1981 article that is taken up and expanded in their current 
article (this is their bottom line—without it other current and prospective ana-
lytical efforts will ultimately fail to make much of a difference) is the importance 
of “sunshine and scrutiny,”  openness that requires access to information and the 
willingness of government (to modernize freedom of information legislation) to 
make available what is required to support competent evaluations and any other 
analytical work that assesses programs, policies, and operations. This theme is 
reflected among US evaluators—in 2008, Eleanor Chelimsky, (then) president of 
the American Evaluation Association, included these observations in her plenary 
address:
But we’re now seeing a metastasis of secrecy, far beyond intelligence and the military, 
into unrelated domains like environmental impacts, or hospital error rates, or drug 
side effects, or student test scores, where no national security interest can possibly be 
invoked. And we’re seeing extensive reclassification of materials that had already been 
declassified. This is a critical issue both for evaluation and for government, because it 
precludes the examination of all the facts, it inserts involuntary advocacy for agency 
programs and policies into “independent evaluations,” it makes a sham of executive 
accountability to the legislature, and it drastically distorts the public’s knowledge of 
what the government is doing. (p. 408)
Another theme in their earlier article that resonates in our current collection 
is the reality that program evaluations are not summative. Instead they are forma-
tive and, although they have uses in program adjustments within departments and 
agencies, they are not strategic, nor do they address questions that would be asked 
as cabinet decision-makers choose among programs and policies.
What are the prospects for program evaluations? Dobell and Zussman do 
not see evaluations having a role in spending review in the future. They even sug-
gest (speculatively) that there may be a point where evaluations (similar to the 
way that medical diagnosis is going, for example) could be assisted with, if not 
conducted by, AIs.
Finally, in assessing deliverology, as promulgated by Sir Michael Barber and 
now the centrepiece of the 2016 federal Policy on Results, Dobell and Zussman are 
prepared to give this initiative more time. They point out that accompanying this 
focus on results is a focus on improving program and policy effectiveness via be-
havioural psychology and behavioural economics—several nudge units have been 
established to conduct experiments and quasi-experiments to improve delivery 
effectiveness. Whether these can deliver remains to be seen. There will be a point 
where this initiative should be evaluated.
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Marie-Pier Marchand and Astrid Brousselle, “Regards sur l’expérience de la 
Commission de révision permanente des programmes au Québec,” contribute 
an article that focuses on Quebec and, more specifically, the recent experience, 
between 2014 and 2016, with the Commission de révision permanente des pro-
grammes (Commission for Permanent Program Review—CRPP) and the process 
undertaken by the Liberal government in Quebec to find ways to cut programs 
sufficient to balance the budget by 2015. Their article describes how this review 
commission was created and how it operated over its 2-year lifespan.
Quebec is one Canadian province that has recently implemented a govern-
ment-wide evaluation function (as of 2013). The function is decentralized to 
administrative departments, and there is a general requirement to comply with 
Treasury Board evaluation policies including preparing a multi-year evaluation 
plan. As evaluation reports are completed, they are forwarded to Treasury Board.
Included among the lines of evidence/information sources used by the CRPP 
were completed program evaluations. It is not clear how those evaluations were 
used—it proved to be impossible to interview persons connected with the com-
mission to get a better sense of how it operated, how it gathered information, even 
what sources of information were taken into account in assessing policy options 
and program cuts. Given the concerns expressed by Dobell and Zussman around 
access to information and the secrecy culture of governments more generally, this 
is noteworthy.
Marchand and Brousselle examined the reports that the commission pro-
duced, including their recommendations, to determine whether and to what ex-
tent the recommendations were reflected in subsequent budgets. The comparisons 
indicated very little correspondence between commission recommendations and 
the 2015 and 2016 budgets. The overall fiscal target was achieved (the Quebec 
government has balanced the budget in the last 2 years) but there is no direct (or 
even indirect) line from evaluations to budget decisions.
Looking ahead, the commission, before it was disbanded, recommended that 
the government create a permanent evaluation function that would be focused 
on conducting summative evaluations with a view to being able to recommend 
program revisions, including program cuts (presumably for those programs found 
wanting in some analytical sense). What is not clear at this time is whether this 
function will be centralized, or instead be layered onto the existing decentralized 
evaluation units—in effect repurposing them.
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